New York Council of Appointment

The New York Council of Appointment is a state body used to illustrate how a small, private appointment committee can blur responsibility for public decisions. In the constitutional argument, its closed deliberations and disputed division of authority contrast with a federal process in which nominations would be public and responsibility for a poor choice more readily assigned.

Structure and Method

The council consisted of the governor and four members of the Senate chosen by the Assembly. The governor claimed the power to nominate and was entitled to a casting vote. If the council divided, he could therefore turn the result in favor of his own nomination. The arrangement concentrated substantial practical influence in the governor while formally placing appointments in a collective body.

Its proceedings, however, were not conducted in public. The governor and council met in a private room, beyond the public eye; accounts of the arrangement describe a gathering with at most four other members and often only two. This small and secluded setting made it easier to influence participants than a larger legislative body and left citizens unable to observe clearly how choices were reached.

Influence and Responsibility

The council’s opacity made responsibility difficult to establish. Although the governor asserted a right to nominate, the extent and manner of its exercise were unclear, as were the occasions on which other members opposed him. When appointments were poor, the uncertainty about who had shaped them weakened public censure: blame lacked a definite target, and the possibility of intrigue remained open.

The argument points to scandalous appointments to important offices, including cases whose impropriety all parties acknowledged. When challenged, the governor blamed the council members, while they blamed his nominations. The public was left unable to determine whose influence had entrusted important interests to people described as manifestly unqualified. The account withholds individual cases, but emphasizes the institutional consequence: shared authority permitted each participant to deflect blame.

Contrast with the Proposed Federal Process

The proposed federal arrangement vested nomination unequivocally in the President and required each nomination to be submitted to the Senate. Because the Senate was an entire branch of the national legislature, the process was expected to attract public notice and make the roles of its participants easier to distinguish. A bad nomination would be charged to the President; rejection of a good one would be charged to the Senate; if an unfit appointment were approved, both would share blame in different degrees.

This contrast makes accountability, rather than the mere number of decision-makers, the central issue. The council’s small size did not guarantee effective scrutiny: secrecy and uncertainty about the governor’s role made its members’ conduct hard to assess. By contrast, the proposed process paired executive initiative with legislative consent and public visibility, so that restraint could operate without erasing responsibility. The council thus serves as a practical example of how private collective decision-making can weaken the public’s ability to identify, criticize, and ultimately discipline officials.